Related papers: New algorithms for matching problems
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…
We present our experimental results of simulating the school choice problem which deals with the assignment of students to schools based on each group's complete preference list for the other group using two algorithms: Boston mechanism and…
We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature, we aim to provide fairness not only to participants, but…
School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of social housing, the one-sided matching problem studies how a set of agents can be assigned to a set of objects when the agents have…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
For a two-sided ($n$ men/$n$ women) stable matching problem) Gale and Shapley studied a proposal algorithm (men propose/women select, or the other way around), that determines a matching, not blocked by any unmatched pair. Irving used this…
In considering the college admissions problem, almost fifty years ago, Gale and Shapley came up with a simple abstraction based on preferences of students and colleges. They introduced the concept of stability and optimality; and proposed…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
We study the efficiency (in terms of social welfare) of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching problems with {\em dichotomous preferences} and {\em normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences}. We are particularly…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
Visual search, recommendation, and contrastive similarity learning power technologies that impact billions of users worldwide. Modern model architectures can be complex and difficult to interpret, and there are several competing techniques…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
While real-world decisions involve many competing objectives, algorithmic decisions are often evaluated with a single objective function. In this paper, we study algorithmic policies which explicitly trade off between a private objective…
We propose and investigate a model for mate searching and marriage in large societies based on a stochastic matching process and simple decision rules. Agents have preferences among themselves given by some probability distribution. They…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…