Related papers: On Parameterized Complexity of Group Activity Sele…
Building upon the results in [Hinterm\"uller et al., SIAM J. Optim, '15], generalized Nash equilibrium problems are considered, in which the feasible set of each player is influenced by the decisions of their competitors. This is realized…
We consider a class of targeted intervention problems in dynamic network and graphon games. First, we study a general dynamic network game in which players interact over a graph and maximize their heterogeneous, concave goal functionals,…
The decision making and management of many engineering networks involves multiple parties with conflicting interests, while each party is constituted with multiple agents. Such problems can be casted as a multi-cluster game. Each cluster is…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
There are many indexes (measures or metrics) in Social Network Analysis (SNA), like density, cohesion, etc. In this paper, we define a new SNA index called "comfortability". One among the lack of many factors, which affect the effectiveness…
Given a task $\mathcal{T}$, a set of experts $V$ with multiple skills and a social network $G(V, W)$ reflecting the compatibility among the experts, team formation is the problem of identifying a team $C \subseteq V$ that is both competent…
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…
In dynamic games with shared constraints, Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE) are often computed using the normalized solution concept, which assumes identical Lagrange multipliers for shared constraints across all players. While widely used,…
We study the complexity of computing stationary Nash equilibrium (NE) in n-player infinite-horizon general-sum stochastic games. We focus on the problem of computing NE in such stochastic games when each player is restricted to choosing a…
We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and…
We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the…
The additively separable hedonic game (ASHG) is a model of coalition formation games on graphs. In this paper, we intensively and extensively investigate the computational complexity of finding several desirable solutions, such as a Nash…
We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the…
Incentive mechanism design is crucial for enabling federated learning. We deal with clustering problem of agents contributing to federated learning setting. Assuming agents behave selfishly, we model their interaction as a stable coalition…
We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first influence intra-party nominees before a general election…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a variant of additively separable hedonic games where agents…
Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is fundamental for practical applications where multiple self-interested agents work together to make optimal decisions. In this work, we study GNEP with shared distributionally robust chance…
We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…