Related papers: Security Game with Non-additive Utilities and Mult…
With the developing of the attack and defense technology, the cyber environment has been more and more sophisticated. We failed to give an accurate evaluation of network security situation, as we lack a more accurate quantitative evaluation…
The security in networked systems depends greatly on recognizing and identifying adversarial behaviors. Traditional detection methods focus on specific categories of attacks and have become inadequate for increasingly stealthy and deceptive…
Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…
Many packing, scheduling and covering problems that were previously considered by computer science literature in the context of various transportation and production problems, appear also suitable for describing and modeling various…
In the classical Binary Networked Public Goods (BNPG) game, a player can either invest in a public project or decide not to invest. Based on the decisions of all the players, each player receives a reward as per his/her utility function.…
We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games introduced by van Benthem. The original definition of the game is inherently finite and therefore does not allow one to model infinite processes. We propose an…
Machine learning techniques are currently used extensively for automating various cybersecurity tasks. Most of these techniques utilize supervised learning algorithms that rely on training the algorithm to classify incoming data into…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
In this paper, we consider a class of $n$-person noncooperative games, where the utility function of every player is given by a homogeneous polynomial defined by the payoff tensor of that player, which is a natural extension of the bimatrix…
Game Theory studies situations in which multiple agents having conflicting objectives have to reach a collective decision. The question of a compact representation language for agents utility function is of crucial importance since the…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
We propose a framework for cyber risk assessment and mitigation which models attackers as formal planners and defenders as interdicting such plans. We illustrate the value of plan interdiction problems by first modeling network cyber risk…
Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…
We fully characterize the core of a broad class of nonlinear games by identifying a suitable relaxation for inherent nonlinearity, directly generalizing the linear frameworks in the literature. This characterization significantly expands…
Interactive-proof games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful but strategic provers, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. Interactive proofs are increasingly used as a framework to…
We provide a general methodology for analyzing defender-attacker based "games" in which we model such games as Markov models and introduce a capacity region to analyze how defensive and adversarial strategies impact security. Such a…
In a multi-objective game, each individual's payoff is a \emph{vector-valued} function of everyone's actions. Under such vectorial payoffs, Pareto-efficiency is used to formulate each individual's best-response condition, inducing…
Finite games in normal form and their mixed extensions are a corner stone of noncooperative game theory. Often generic finite games and their mixed extensions are considered. But the properties which one expects in generic games and the…
This paper introduces a geometric framework for analyzing power relations in games, independent of their strategic form. We define a canonical preference space where each player's relational stance is a normalized vector. This model…
We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…