Related papers: Equilibrium Approximation Quality of Current No-Li…

Several works have shown unconditional hardness (via integrality gaps) of computing equilibria using strong hierarchies of convex relaxations. Such results however only apply to the problem of computing equilibria that optimize a certain…

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…

In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…

This paper investigates the challenge of learning in black-box games, where the underlying utility function is unknown to any of the agents. While there is an extensive body of literature on the theoretical analysis of algorithms for…

Optimization of deep learning algorithms to approach Nash Equilibrium remains a significant problem in imperfect information games, e.g. StarCraft and poker. Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) has provided an effective way to learn…

Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…

This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to…

We study the deterministic and randomized query complexity of finding approximate equilibria in bimatrix games. We show that the deterministic query complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium when $\epsilon < \frac{1}{2}$ is…

We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…

We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…

Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has several weaknesses, since it may prescribe to play sub-optimal…

Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…

Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make…

Subgame solving is a technique for scaling algorithms to large games by locally refining a precomputed blueprint strategy during gameplay. While straightforward in perfect-information games where search starts from the current state,…

We consider a weighted Shapley network design game, where selfish players choose paths in a network to minimize their cost. The cost function of each edge in the network is affine linear with respect to the sum of weights of the players who…

We consider the computation of a Nash equilibrium in attack and defense games on networks (Bloch et al. [1]). We prove that a Nash Equilibrium of the game can be computed in polynomial time with respect to the number of nodes in the…

We conjecture that PPAD has a PCP-like complete problem, seeking a near equilibrium in which all but very few players have very little incentive to deviate. We show that, if one assumes that this problem requires exponential time, several…

We consider $\epsilon$-equilibria notions for constant value of $\epsilon$ in $n$-player $m$-actions games where $m$ is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid size over the mixed strategies such that…

We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…

In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…