Related papers: Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to…
We consider the budgeted matroid independent set problem. The input is a ground set, where each element has a cost and a non-negative profit, along with a matroid over the elements and a budget. The goal is to select a subset of elements…
In budget-feasible mechanism design, a buyer wishes to procure a set of items of maximum value from self-interested players. We have a valuation function $v:2^U \to \mathbb{R}_+$, where $U$ is the set of all items, where $v(S)$ specifies…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem aims to design a mechanism which incentivizes the sellers to…
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…
We study the budgeted laminar matroid independent set problem. The input is a ground set, where each element has a cost and a non-negative profit, along with a laminar matroid over the elements and a budget. The goal is to select a maximum…
We study budgeted variants of well known maximization problems with multiple matroid constraints. Given an $\ell$-matchoid $\cm$ on a ground set $E$, a profit function $p:E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, a cost function $c:E \rightarrow…
A natural way to deal with multiple, partially conflicting objectives is turning all the objectives but one into budget constraints. Some classical polynomial-time optimization problems, such as spanning tree and forest, shortest path,…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…
We consider the following Stochastic Boolean Function Evaluation problem, which is closely related to several problems from the literature. A matroid $\mathcal{M}$ (in compact representation) on ground set $E$ is given, and each element…
In budget-feasible mechanism design, there is a set of items $U$, each owned by a distinct seller. The seller of item $e$ incurs a private cost $\overline{c}_e$ for supplying her item. A buyer wishes to procure a set of items from the…
In the classical experimental design setting, an experimenter E has access to a population of $n$ potential experiment subjects $i\in \{1,...,n\}$, each associated with a vector of features $x_i\in R^d$. Conducting an experiment with…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among additive agents with feasibility constraints. In these settings, every agent is restricted to get a bundle among a specified set of feasible bundles. Such scenarios have been of great…
We study the online submodular maximization problem with free disposal under a matroid constraint. Elements from some ground set arrive one by one in rounds, and the algorithm maintains a feasible set that is independent in the underlying…
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these…
We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently,…
We study the minimum weight basis problem on matroid when elements' weights are uncertain. For each element we only know a set of possible values (an uncertainty area) that contains its real weight. In some cases there exist bases that are…
We study the budgeted versions of the well known matching and matroid intersection problems. While both problems admit a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) [Berger et al. (Math. Programming, 2011), Chekuri, Vondrak and Zenklusen…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the…