Related papers: Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
A matroid is a notion of independence in combinatorial optimization which is closely related to computational efficiency. In particular, it is well known that the maximum of a constrained modular function can be found greedily if and only…
In the matroid buyback problem, an algorithm observes a sequence of bids and must decide whether to accept each bid at the moment it arrives, subject to a matroid constraint on the set of accepted bids. Decisions to reject bids are…
In this work, we consider robust submodular maximization with matroid constraints. We give an efficient bi-criteria approximation algorithm that outputs a small family of feasible sets whose union has (nearly) optimal objective value. This…
We introduce a new iterative rounding technique to round a point in a matroid polytope subject to further matroid constraints. This technique returns an independent set in one matroid with limited violations of the other ones. On top of the…
We introduce the parametric matroid one-interdiction problem. Given a matroid, each element of its ground set is associated with a weight that depends linearly on a real parameter from a given parameter interval. The goal is to find, for…
In the buyback problem, an algorithm observes a sequence of bids and must decide whether to accept each bid at the moment it arrives, subject to some constraints on the set of accepted bids. Decisions to reject bids are irrevocable, whereas…
We study Bayesian mechanism design problems in settings where agents have budgets. Specifically, an agent's utility for an outcome is given by his value for the outcome minus any payment he makes to the mechanism, as long as the payment is…
Consider the following online version of the submodular maximization problem under a matroid constraint: We are given a set of elements over which a matroid is defined. The goal is to incrementally choose a subset that remains independent…
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…
We study a family of matroid optimization problems with a linear constraint (MOL). In these problems, we seek a subset of elements which optimizes (i.e., maximizes or minimizes) a linear objective function subject to (i) a matroid…
In this paper, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation ratio of $2$, improving the previous best known result of $3$. Our…
For constrained, not necessarily monotone submodular maximization, all known approximation algorithms with ratio greater than $1/e$ require continuous ideas, such as queries to the multilinear extension of a submodular function and its…
Maintaining a maximum bipartite matching online while minimizing recourse/augmentations is a well studied problem, motivated by content delivery, job scheduling, and hashing. A breakthrough result of Bernstein, Holm, and Rotenberg…
One of the main challenges in mechanism design is to carefully engineer incentives ensuring truthfulness while maintaining strong social welfare approximation guarantees. But these objectives are often in conflict, making it impossible to…
The goal of diagnosis is to compute good repair strategies in response to anomalous system behavior. In a decision theoretic framework, a good repair strategy has low expected cost. In a general formulation of the problem, the computation…
In this study, we consider a class of linear matroid interdiction problems, where the feasible sets for the upper-level decision-maker (referred to as a leader) and the lower-level decision-maker (referred to as a follower) are induced by…
The standard oracle model for matroid algorithms assumes that each independence query can be answered in constant time, regardless of the size of the queried set. While this abstraction has underpinned much of the theoretical progress in…
In the budget-feasible allocation problem, a set of items with varied sizes and values are to be allocated to a group of agents. Each agent has a budget constraint on the total size of items she can receive. The goal is to compute a…
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or…