Related papers: Constrained Pure Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Gam…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it…

We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…

We study the deterministic and randomized query complexity of finding approximate equilibria in bimatrix games. We show that the deterministic query complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium when $\epsilon < \frac{1}{2}$ is…

Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…

We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for…

We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…

We study natural improvement dynamics in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of maximum degree $d\geq 1$. We focus on two problems regarding the existence and efficiency of approximate pure Nash equilibria, with a reasonable…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…

In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…

We provide an in-depth study of Nash equilibria in multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs), i.e., normal form games with vectorial payoffs. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume that each player's utility can be modelled with a…

We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…

We consider a nonzero-sum N-player Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The payoff functions are bounded Carath\'eodory functions and the transitions of the system are assumed to have a…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…