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Coalition formation explores how to partition a set of $n$ agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. We consider a cardinal utility model with an additively separable aggregation of preferences and study the online…
We consider a tournament among four equally strong semifinalists. The players have to decide how much stamina to use in the semifinals, provided that the rest is available in the final and the third-place playoff. We investigate optimal…
The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…
We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player…
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
We study stochastic mean-field games among finite number of teams with large finite as well as infinite number of decision makers. For this class of games within static and dynamic settings, we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium,…
We consider the allocation of limited resources to heterogeneous customers who arrive in an online fashion. We would like to allocate the resources "fairly", so that no group of customers is marginalized in terms of their overall service…
This paper examines a competition game whose key variables are the R&D efforts (e.g. R&D expenditures) and accumulated knowledge of firms located in a specific region. The most significant element of accumulated knowledge is knowledge…
We study the subclass of singleton congestion games with identical and increasing cost functions, i.e., each agent tries to utilize from the least crowded resource in her accessible subset of resources. Our main contribution is a novel…
This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…
Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer economic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social interactions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem,…
We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly…