Related papers: Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Method…
We present theoretical and empirical results demonstrating the usefulness of voting rules for participatory democracies. We first give algorithms which efficiently elicit \epsilon-approximations to two prominent voting rules: the Borda rule…
We study the problem of minimizing metric distortion in multi-winner elections, where a committee of size $k$ is selected from a set of candidates based on voters' ordinal preferences. We assume that voters and candidates are embedded on a…
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a…
May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to…
Aggregating preferences under incomplete or constrained feedback is a fundamental problem in social choice and related domains. While prior work has established strong impossibility results for pairwise comparisons, this paper extends the…
This paper analyzes a variation on the well-known "power of two choices" allocation algorithms. Classically, the smallest of $d$ randomly-chosen options is selected. We investigate what happens when the largest of $d$ randomly-chosen…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
Elections and opinion polls often have many candidates, with the aim to either rank the candidates or identify a small set of winners according to voters' preferences. In practice, voters do not provide a full ranking; instead, each voter…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…
We study the problem of fair sequential decision making given voter preferences. In each round, a decision rule must choose a decision from a set of alternatives where each voter reports which of these alternatives they approve. Instead of…
The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of most rules that have been proposed and…
Voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference orders have been recently proposed, like majority judgement, range voting or approval voting. Traditionally, probabilistic analysis of voting rules supposes the use of…
This survey provides an exposition of a suite of techniques based on the theory of polynomials, collectively referred to as polynomial methods, which have recently been applied to address several challenging problems in statistical…
A committee's decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted voting method, and so does the distribution of power among the committee members. We investigate how different aggregation methods such as plurality runoff,…
Diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in text-to-image generation, yet aligning them with human preference remains challenging due to the presence of multiple, sometimes conflicting, evaluation metrics (e.g., semantic…
We consider the challenge of AI value alignment with multiple individuals that have different reward functions and optimal policies in an underlying Markov decision process. We formalize this problem as one of policy aggregation, where the…
We consider different choice procedures such as scoring rules, rules, using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix, which are used in social and multi-criteria choice problems. We focus on the study of the properties that…
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of…
On the basis of a formula for calculating seat shares and natural thresholds in multidistrict elections under the Jefferson-D'Hondt system and a probabilistic model of electoral behavior based on P\'{o}lya's urn model, we propose a new…
We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination…