Related papers: On ($1$, $\epsilon$)-Restricted Max-Min Fair Alloc…
We consider the problem of allocating a set $I$ of $m$ indivisible resources (items) to a set $P$ of $n$ customers (players) competing for the resources. Each resource $j \in I$ has a same value $v_j > 0$ for a subset of customers…
In the budget-feasible allocation problem, a set of items with varied sizes and values are to be allocated to a group of agents. Each agent has a budget constraint on the total size of items she can receive. The goal is to compute a…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with submodular valuation functions, where agents may have either equal entitlements or arbitrary (possibly unequal) entitlements. We focus on share-based fairness…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating indivisible, mixed-manna items. For basic measures of fairness, this problem is hard in general. Thus, research has flourished concerning input classes where efficient algorithms…
Diversity maximization aims to select a diverse and representative subset of items from a large dataset. It is a fundamental optimization task that finds applications in data summarization, feature selection, web search, recommender…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We consider the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating a set $\mathcal{G}$ of indivisible goods to a set $\mathcal{N}$ of agents. We study instances, in which all agents have 2-value additive valuations: The value of…
We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of items both in the case where items are goods (positive utility) and when they are chores (negative utility). We show that fair allocations of goods and chores have some fundamental connections…
We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the desirable fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based notion, in which an…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents, where each agent's valuation is fractionally subadditive (XOS). With respect to AnyPrice Share (APS) fairness, Kulkarni et al. (2024) showed that, when agents have…
We consider the following control problem on fair allocation of indivisible goods. Given a set $I$ of items and a set of agents, each having strict linear preference over the items, we ask for a minimum subset of the items whose deletion…
We consider the Min-$r$-Lin$(Z_m)$ problem: given a system $S$ of length-$r$ linear equations modulo $m$, find $Z \subseteq S$ of minimum cardinality such that $S-Z$ is satisfiable. The problem is NP-hard and UGC-hard to approximate in…
In this paper we study the problem of allocating a scarce resource among several players (or agents). A central decision maker wants to maximize the total utility of all agents. However, such a solution may be unfair for one or more agents…
Partitioning a set of $n$ items or agents while maximizing the value of the partition is a fundamental algorithmic task. We study this problem in the specific setting of maximizing social welfare in additively separable hedonic games.…
One of the important yet insufficiently studied subjects in fair allocation is the externality effect among agents. For a resource allocation problem, externalities imply that a bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utilities of other…
We revisit the classic Pandora's Box (PB) problem under correlated distributions on the box values. Recent work of arXiv:1911.01632 obtained constant approximate algorithms for a restricted class of policies for the problem that visit boxes…
We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
We study the approximability of the NP-complete \textsc{Maximum Minimal Feedback Vertex Set} problem. Informally, this natural problem seems to lie in an intermediate space between two more well-studied problems of this type:…