Related papers: Dependent Types for Extensive Games
In order to better understand reasoning involved in analyzing infinite games in extensive form, we performed experiments in the proof assistant Coq that are reported here.
We show open games cover extensive form games with both perfect and imperfect information. Doing so forces us to address two current weaknesses in open games: the lack of a notion of player and their agency within open games, and the lack…
We present a game semantics for intuitionistic type theory. Specifically, we propose categories with families of a new variant of games and strategies for both extensional and intensional variants of the type theory with dependent function,…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
In previous work on higher-order games, we accounted for finite games of unbounded length by working with continuous outcome functions, which carry implicit game trees. In this work we make such trees explicit. We use concepts from…
Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…
The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equilibria of multi-player strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a fixed dependency…
Extensive-form games constitute the standard representation scheme for games with a temporal component. But do all extensive-form games correspond to protocols that we can implement in the real world? We often rule out games with imperfect…
Cooperative Bayesian games (BGs) can model decision-making problems for teams of agents under imperfect information, but require space and computation time that is exponential in the number of agents. While agent independence has been used…
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical toolkit to analyse the interactions that an individual agent has in a population and how the composition of strategies in this population evolves over time. While it can provide neat solutions to…
This paper uses category theory to develop an entirely new approach to approximate game theory. Game theory is the study of how different agents within a multi-agent system take decisions. At its core, game theory asks what an optimal…
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…
Causal games are probabilistic graphical models that enable causal queries to be answered in multi-agent settings. They extend causal Bayesian networks by specifying decision and utility variables to represent the agents' degrees of freedom…
The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equilibria of multi-player strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a fixed dependency…
We provide a self-contained introduction to finite extensive games with perfect information. In these games players proceed in turns having, at each stage, finitely many moves to their disposal, each play always ends, and in each play the…
An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, depending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-adjoint…
This paper develops the category $\mathbf{NCG}$. Its objects are node-and-choice games, which include essentially all extensive-form games. Its morphisms allow arbitrary transformations of a game's nodes, choices, and players, as well as…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
In the real world, agents or entities are in a continuous state of interactions. These inter- actions lead to various types of complexity dynamics. One key difficulty in the study of complex agent interactions is the difficulty of modeling…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…