Related papers: Hotelling-Downs Model with Limited Attraction

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and…

We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to calculate the…

In this work, we consider a population composed of a continuum of agents that seek to maximize a payoff function by moving on a network. The nodes in the network may represent physical locations or abstract choices. The population is…

Many applications of RCTs involve the presence of multiple treatment administrators -- from field experiments to online advertising -- that compete for the subjects' attention. In the face of competition, estimating a causal effect becomes…

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash…

We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. The class we consider includes all auctions that allocate…

We consider an example of stochastic games with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information. We obtain relevant equilibrium policies using a new approach which allows managing the belief updates in a structured manner. Agents have…

In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users…

In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…

In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the…

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides…

We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…

We study the convergence of best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex cost functions (these games always have a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium). We show that best-response dynamics rapidly converges to the equilibrium…

We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)…

In this paper, we introduce discrete-time linear mean-field games subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of a generic agent is a compact Borel space. At every time, each agent is randomly…

With a multilateral vertical contracting model of media markets, we examine upstream competition and contractual arrangements in content provision. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream…

Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…

While it is known that shared quantum entanglement can offer improved solutions to a number of purely cooperative tasks for groups of remote agents, controversy remains regarding the legitimacy of quantum games in a competitive setting--in…

We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…