Related papers: Sensitivity Analysis for Convex Separable Optimiza…
We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…
Understanding how the optimal value of an optimisation problem changes when its input data is modified is an old question in mathematical optimisation. This paper investigates the computation of the optimal values of a family of (possibly…
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
Self-play is a technique for machine learning in multi-agent systems where a learning algorithm learns by interacting with copies of itself. Self-play is useful for generating large quantities of data for learning, but has the drawback that…
This work considers a stochastic Nash game in which each player solves a parameterized stochastic optimization problem. In deterministic regimes, best-response schemes have been shown to be convergent under a suitable spectral property…
In this thesis, we settle the computational complexity of some fundamental questions in polynomial optimization. These include the questions of (i) finding a local minimum, (ii) testing local minimality of a point, and (iii) deciding…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…
The famous Braess paradox describes the following phenomenon: It might happen that the improvement of resources, like building a new street within a congested network, may in fact lead to larger costs for the players in an equilibrium. In…
We consider a class of hierarchical noncooperative $N$-player games where the $i$th player solves a parametrized stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) with the caveat that the implicit form of the $i$th…
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic…
In this paper, we consider the problem of identifying a linear map from measurements which are subject to intermittent and arbitarily large errors. This is a fundamental problem in many estimation-related applications such as fault…
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
We propose an algorithm for generating explicit solutions of multiparametric mixed-integer convex programs to within a given suboptimality tolerance. The algorithm is applicable to a very general class of optimization problems, but is most…
Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algorithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game…
Convex maximization encompasses a broad class of optimization problems and is generally NP-hard, even for low-rank objectives. This paper investigates structural conditions under which convex maximization becomes polynomially solvable. From…
Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algorithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game…
Following a polynomial approach, many robust fixed-order controller design problems can be formulated as optimization problems whose set of feasible solutions is modelled by parametrized polynomial matrix inequalities (PMI). These…
We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that combines the…
We consider Nash-Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium models involving separable concave cost functions. In contrast to the models with linear and convex cost functions, in these models a local equilibrium point may not be a global one. We…
Nash equilibrium} (NE) can be stated as a formal theorem on a multilinear form, free of game theory terminology. On the other hand, inspired by this formalism, we state and prove a {\it multilinear minimax theorem}, a generalization of von…