Related papers: Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium Computation in …
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
The sequence form, owing to its compact and holistic strategy representation, has demonstrated significant efficiency in computing normal-form perfect equilibria for two-player extensive-form games with perfect recall. Nevertheless, the…
Policy gradient methods have become a staple of any single-agent reinforcement learning toolbox, due to their combination of desirable properties: iterate convergence, efficient use of stochastic trajectory feedback, and theoretically-sound…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…
We propose a framework to compute approximate Nash equilibria in integer programming games with nonlinear payoffs, i.e., simultaneous and non-cooperative games where each player solves a parametrized mixed-integer nonlinear program. We…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
We consider the problem of computing stationary points in min-max optimization, with a particular focus on the special case of computing Nash equilibria in (two-)team zero-sum games. We first show that computing $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria…
Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive…
We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We prove that finding an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant $\epsilon$ and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions. As…
Although logit quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) offers a natural equilibrium selection mechanism and converges to Nash equilibrium as the rationality parameter tends to infinity, its computation in extensive-form games is generally…
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (epsilon-Nash equilibria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant. We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It…
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model…
We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE…
This paper resolves the open question of designing near-optimal algorithms for learning imperfect-information extensive-form games from bandit feedback. We present the first line of algorithms that require only…