Related papers: Countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noi…
Detector blinding attacks have been proposed in the last few years, and they could potentially threaten the security of QKD systems. Even though no complete QKD system has been hacked yet, it is nevertheless important to consider…
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully…
In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the…
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution provides a theoretical unconditionally secure solution to distribute symmetric keys among users in a communication network. However, the practical devices used to implement these systems are…
In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding…
A particularly successful detector blinding attack has been recently demonstrated on various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, performing for the first time an undetectable and complete recovery of the key. In this paper two original…
In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However,…
Implementation of high-speed quantum key distribution~(QKD) has become one of the major focus in the field, which produces high key-generation rate for applications. To achieve high-speed QKD, tailored techniques are developed and employed…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a…
We present an active anti-latching system for superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors. We experimentally test it against a bright-light attack, previously used to compromise security of quantum key distribution. Although our system…
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these…
We propose an efficient strategy to attack a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) system, that we call homodyne detector blinding. This attack strategy takes advantage of a generic vulnerability of homodyne receivers: a…
The contrast of an image can be degraded by the presence of background light and sensor noise. To overcome this degradation, quantum illumination protocols have been theorised (Science 321 (2008), Physics Review Letters 101 (2008)) that…
We propose a novel dark matter detection scheme by leveraging quantum coherence across a network of multiple quantum sensors. This method effectively eliminates incoherent background noise, thereby significantly enhancing detection…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a quantum-proof key-exchange scheme which is fast approaching the communication industry. An essential component in QKD is the information reconciliation step, which is used for correcting the…
We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a…
We present a countermeasure against the detector blinding attack (DBA) utilizing statistical analysis of error and double-click events accumulated during a quantum key distribution session under randomized modulation of single-photon…
Attacks that control single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution using tailored bright illumination are capable of eavesdropping the secret key. Here we report an automated testbench that checks the detector's vulnerabilities…
Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated InGaAs APDs. In order to devise…