Related papers: Zero-sum continuous-time Markov pure jump game ove…
This paper addresses a class of two-person zero-sum stochastic differential equations, which encompass Markov chains and fractional Brownian motion, and satisfy some monotonicity conditions over an infinite time horizon. Within the…
We study a general formulation of the classical two-player Dynkin game in a discrete time Markovian setting. We identify an appropriate class of mixed strategies -- \textit{Markovian randomized stopping times} -- in which players stop at…
We consider a discrete-time Markov decision process with Borel state and action spaces. The performance criterion is to maximize a total expected {utility determined by unbounded return function. It is shown the existence of optimal…
In this paper we investigate a differential game in which countably many dynamical objects pursue a single one. All the players perform simple motions. The duration of the game is fixed. The controls of a group of pursuers are subject to…
Zero-sum Dynkin games under Poisson constraints, where players can only stop at the event times of a Poisson process, have been studied widely in the recent literature. The constraint can be modelled in two ways: either both players share…
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the…
We revisit the problem of learning in two-player zero-sum Markov games, focusing on developing an algorithm that is uncoupled, convergent, and rational, with non-asymptotic convergence rates. We start from the case of stateless matrix game…
We consider a symmetric $n$-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with controlled jumps and mean-field type interaction among the players. Each player minimizes some expected cost by affecting the drift as well as the jump part of…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum…
The paper deals with a zero-sum differential game in which the dynamical system is described by a fractional differential equation with the Caputo derivative of an order $\alpha \in (0, 1).$ The goal of the first (second) player is to…
We consider a zero-sum stochastic differential game over elementary mixed feed-back strategies. These are strategies based only on the knowledge of the past state, randomized continuously in time from a sampling distribution which is kept…
This article considers a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion models in which agents aim at reaching a given target set and wish to minimize a cost consisting of an individual running cost, an individual cost depending on the…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…
We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino.…