Related papers: A Convex Programming-based Algorithm for Mean Payo…

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…

The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a…

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…

This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…

Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…

We study the game modification problem, where a benevolent game designer or a malevolent adversary modifies the reward function of a zero-sum Markov game so that a target deterministic or stochastic policy profile becomes the unique Markov…

In two-player games on graphs, the simplest possible strategies are those that can be implemented without any memory. These are called positional strategies. In this paper, we characterize objectives recognizable by deterministic B\"uchi…

We consider imperfect information stochastic games where we require the players to use pure (i.e. non randomised) strategies. We consider reachability, safety, B\"uchi and co-B\"uchi objectives, and investigate the existence of…

Solving parity games is a major building block for numerous applications in reactive program verification and synthesis. While they can be solved efficiently in practice, no known approach has a polynomial worst-case runtime complexity. We…

We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an $\ep$-equilibrium for all $\varepsilon>0$.

We consider a zero-sum stochastic game for continuous-time Markov chain with countable state space and unbounded transition and pay-off rates. The additional feature of the game is that the controllers together with taking actions are also…

Computational equilibrium finding in large zero-sum extensive-form imperfect-information games has led to significant recent AI breakthroughs. The fastest algorithms for the problem are new forms of counterfactual regret minimization [Brown…

We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model…

We give a converging semidefinite programming hierarchy of outer approximations for the set of quantum correlations of fixed dimension and derive analytical bounds on the convergence speed of the hierarchy. In particular, we give a…

This paper studies the implementation of Bayes correlated equilibria in symmetric Bayesian games with nonatomic players, using direct information structures and obedient strategies. The main results demonstrate full implementation in a…

Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…

We consider 3XOR games with perfect commuting operator strategies. Given any 3XOR game, we show existence of a perfect commuting operator strategy for the game can be decided in polynomial time. Previously this problem was not known to be…

Suppose that an $m$-simplex is partitioned into $n$ convex regions having disjoint interiors and distinct labels, and we may learn the label of any point by querying it. The learning objective is to know, for any point in the simplex, a…