Related papers: Dividing goods and bads under additive utilities
We study how market segmentation affects consumers when a monopolist can adjust both prices and product qualities across segments, engaging in second- and third-degree price discrimination simultaneously. We characterize the…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to multiple agents and focus on the proportionality, which is one of the classical fairness notions. Since proportional allocations do not always exist when goods are…
To divide a "manna" {\Omega} of private items (commodities, workloads, land, time intervals) between n agents, the worst case measure of fairness is the welfare guaranteed to each agent, irrespective of others' preferences. If the manna is…
We study fair allocation of resources consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations. When only divisible or indivisible goods exist, it is known that an allocation that achieves the maximum Nash…
This paper studies cooperative data-sharing between competitors vying to predict a consumer's tastes. We design optimal data-sharing schemes both for when they compete only with each other, and for when they additionally compete with an…
In this paper, we analyze the problem of how to adapt the concept of proportionality to situations where several perfectly divisible resources have to be allocated among certain set of agents that have exactly one claim which is used for…
The problem of fair division of indivisible goods has been receiving much attention recently. The prominent metric of envy-freeness can always be satisfied in the divisible goods setting (see for example \cite{BT95}), but often cannot be…
The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online platforms. Little is known, however, about the characteristics…
Resource allocation problems are a fundamental domain in which to evaluate the fairness properties of algorithms. The trade-offs between fairness and utilization have a long history in this domain. A recent line of work has considered…
We propose a simple yet effective solution to tackle the often-competing goals of fairness and utility in classification tasks. While fairness ensures that the model's predictions are unbiased and do not discriminate against any particular…
We discuss price competition when positive network effects are the only other factor in consumption choices. We show that partitioning consumers into two groups creates a rich enough interaction structure to induce negative marginal demand…
Consensus halving refers to the problem of dividing a resource into two parts so that every agent values both parts equally. Prior work has shown that when the resource is represented by an interval, a consensus halving with at most $n$…
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an…
We introduce pricing formulas for competition and collusion models of two-sided markets with an outside option. For the competition model, we find conditions under which prices and consumer surplus may increase or decrease if the outside…
We study the fair division of indivisible items. In the general model, the goal is to allocate $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents while satisfying fairness criteria such as MMS, EF1, and EFX. We also study a recently-introduced graphical…
This paper proposes a method for estimating consumer preferences among discrete choices, where the consumer chooses at most one product in a category, but selects from multiple categories in parallel. The consumer's utility is additive in…
When allocating objects among agents with equal rights, people often evaluate the fairness of an allocation rule by comparing their received utilities to a benchmark share - a function only of her own valuation and the number of agents.…
In a consideration set model, an individual maximizes utility among the considered alternatives. I relate a consideration set additive random utility model to classic discrete choice and the extended additive random utility model, in which…
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule, which chooses an allocation maximizing the product of the agents' utilities, has received substantial attention for its fairness. We characterize MNW as the only…