Related papers: Efficient Best-Response Computation for Strategic …
We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
We study automated security response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed, non-stationary game. We relax the standard assumption that the game model is correctly…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…
This paper considers a conjecture-based distributed learning approach that enables autonomous nodes to independently optimize their transmission probabilities in random access networks. We model the interaction among multiple…
This paper establishes the tractability of finding the optimal Nash equilibrium, as well as the optimal social solution, to a discrete congestion game using a gate-model quantum computer. The game is of the type originally posited by…
Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such…
Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…
In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…
The vulnerability of deep neural network models to adversarial example attacks is a practical challenge in many artificial intelligence applications. A recent line of work shows that the use of randomization in adversarial training is the…
Decision making in modern large-scale and complex systems such as communication networks, smart electricity grids, and cyber-physical systems motivate novel game-theoretic approaches. This paper investigates big strategic (non-cooperative)…
Game theory has been applied to investigate network security. But different security scenarios were often modeled via different types of games and analyzed in an ad-hoc manner. In this paper, we propose an algebraic approach for modeling…
In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. The presence of ties…
Motivated by emerging resource allocation and data placement problems such as web caches and peer-to-peer systems, we consider and study a class of resource allocation problems over a network of agents (nodes). In this model, nodes can…
This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual…
Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…