Related papers: Independent Lazy Better-Response Dynamics on Netwo…

We study a multi-agent reinforcement learning dynamics, and analyze its asymptotic behavior in infinite-horizon discounted Markov potential games. We focus on the independent and decentralized setting, where players do not know the game…

Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID--19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

A two-dimensional small-world type network, subject to spatial prisoners' dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node with a finite density of directed random links to the other nodes in the network, is…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…

We introduce the stochastic Network-Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD) model, a network of players playing the Prisoner's Dilemma with their neighbours, each with a memory-one strategy which they constantly and locally update to improve…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

In this paper, we consider a learning problem among non-cooperative agents interacting in a time-varying system. Specifically, we focus on repeated linear quadratic network games, in which the network of interactions changes with time and…

We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…

We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…

We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…

We here study the Battle of the Sexes game, a textbook case of asymmetric games, on small networks. Due to the conflicting preferences of the players, analytical approaches are scarce and most often update strategies are employed in…

The training dynamics of linear networks are well studied in two distinct setups: the lazy regime and balanced/active regime, depending on the initialization and width of the network. We provide a surprisingly simple unifying formula for…

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…

Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…

Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform…

We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between a legitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game where the value to maximize/minimize is the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most of the approaches…

A cyber security problem in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game-theoretic approach is considered. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes…

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…