Related papers: Random Popular Matchings with Incomplete Preferenc…
This paper develops a method to use singles' data in a non-parametric revealed preference setting of collective household choice. We use it to test the controversial assumption of preference stability between singles and couples, without…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
We examine the following voting situation. A committee of $k$ people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will submit a list of $j$ candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee. We…
Recovering and distinguishing between the strict-preference, indifference and/or indecisiveness parts of a decision maker's preferences is a challenging task but also important for testing theory and conducting welfare analysis. This paper…
In Bayesian statistics, one's prior beliefs about underlying model parameters are revised with the information content of observed data from which, using Bayes' rule, a posterior belief is obtained. A non-trivial example taken from the…
In recent years rank aggregation has received significant attention from the machine learning community. The goal of such a problem is to combine the (partially revealed) preferences over objects of a large population into a single,…
I present an analytic approach to establishing the presence of phase transitions in a large set of decision problems. This approach does not require extensive computational study of the problems considered. The set -- that of all paddable…
We study the computational complexity of explaining preference data through Boolean attribute models (BAMs), motivated by extensive research involving attribute models and their promise in understanding preference structure and enabling…
We designed and ran an experiment to test how often people's choices are reversed by others' recommendations when facing different levels of confirmation and conformity pressures. In our experiment participants were first asked to provide…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
In this paper, we study planning in stochastic systems, modeled as Markov decision processes (MDPs), with preferences over temporally extended goals. Prior work on temporal planning with preferences assumes that the user preferences form a…
We consider equilibrium one-on-one conversations between neighbors on a circular table, with the goal of assessing the likelihood of a (perhaps) familiar situation: sitting at a table where both of your neighbors are talking to someone…
When people pursue rewards in stochastic environments, they often match their choice frequencies to the observed target frequencies, even when this policy is demonstrably sub-optimal. We used a ``hide and seek'' task to evaluate this…
Our input is a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B,E)$ where each vertex in $A \cup B$ has a preference list strictly ranking its neighbors. The vertices in $A$ and in $B$ are called students and courses, respectively. Each student $a$ seeks to…
Top-N recommendation aims to recommend each consumer a small set of N items from a large collection of items, and its accuracy is one of the most common indexes to evaluate the performance of a recommendation system. While a large number of…
We consider the well-studied Hospital Residents (HR) problem in the presence of lower quotas (LQ). The input instance consists of a bipartite graph $G = (\mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{H}, E)$ where $\mathcal{R}$ and $\mathcal{H}$ denote sets of…
In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…
Popularity bias is a pervasive problem in recommender systems, where recommendations disproportionately favor popular items. This not only results in "rich-get-richer" dynamics and a homogenization of visible content, but can also lead to…
A preference profile with $m$ alternatives and $n$ voters is $d$-Manhattan (resp. $d$-Euclidean) if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into the $d$-dimensional space such that between each pair of alternatives, every voter…
This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…