Related papers: Strategic Seeding of Rival Opinions
We consider the model of information diffusion in social networks from \cite{Hui2010a} which incorporates trust (weighted links) between actors, and allows actors to actively participate in the spreading process, specifically through the…
We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
The voter model on networks is crucial to understand opinion formation. Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model on a…
Among different aspects of social networks, dynamics have been proposed to simulate how opinions can be transmitted. In this study, we propose a model that simulates the communication in an online social network, in which the posts are…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
We introduce and study a novel majority-based opinion diffusion model. Consider a graph $G$, which represents a social network. Assume that initially a subset of nodes, called seed nodes or early adopters, are colored either black or white,…
We consider the problem of budget allocation for competitive influence maximization over social networks. In this problem, multiple competing parties (players) want to distribute their limited advertising resources over a set of social…
Influence maximization is the task of selecting a small number of seed nodes in a social network to maximize the influence spread from these seeds. It has been widely investigated in the past two decades. In the canonical setting, the…
We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph $G(n,p)$. Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of…
We propose a continuous-time nonlinear model of opinion dynamics with utility-maximizing agents connected via a social influence network. A distinguishing feature of the proposed model is the inclusion of an opinion-dependent…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
As autonomous AI agents increasingly mediate online platform markets, a fundamental question emerges: do these markets generate stable strategic outcomes? In repeated strategic environments, the Nash equilibrium provides a natural benchmark…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information-sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When…
A widely studied process of influence diffusion in social networks posits that the dynamics of influence diffusion evolves as follows: Given a graph $G=(V,E)$, representing the network, initially \emph{only} the members of a given…
The focus of this work is on designing influencing strategies to shape the collective opinion of a network of individuals. We consider a variant of the voter model where opinions evolve in one of two ways. In the absence of external…
At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…