Related papers: Strategic Seeding of Rival Opinions

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…

This paper explores distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems for games in which the players have limited knowledge on other players' actions. In particular, the involved players are considered to be high-order integrators with their…

We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in determining whether…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

We formulate two-party policy competition as a two-player non-cooperative game, generalizing Lin et al.'s work (2021). Each party selects a real-valued policy vector as its strategy from a compact subset of Euclidean space, and a voter's…

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides…

In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…

When multiple influencers attempt to compete for a receiver's attention, their influencing strategies must account for the presence of one another. We introduce the Battling Influencers Game (BIG), a multi-player simultaneous-move…

Opinion and belief dynamics are a central topic in the study of social interactions through dynamical systems. In this work, we study a model where, at each discrete time, all the agents update their opinion as an average of their intrinsic…

In games of friendship links and behaviors, I propose $k$-player Nash stability---a family of equilibria, indexed by a measure of robustness given by the number of permitted link changes, which is (ordinally and cardinally) ranked in a…

This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…

A social choice procedure is modeled as a repeated Nash game between the social agents, who are communicating with each other through a social communication network modeled by an undirected graph. The agents' criteria for this game are…

We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the…

In this paper, we study a strategic model of marketing and product consumption in social networks. We consider two competing firms in a market providing two substitutable products with preset qualities. Agents choose their consumptions…

Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken…

In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…

We study the consequences of adopting products by agents who form a social network. To this end we use the threshold model introduced in Apt and Markakis, arXiv:1105.2434, in which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out…

Finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information are difficult because actions both move payoffs and reshape what opponents learn, generating hierarchies of beliefs about beliefs. This paper provides a recursive representation…