Related papers: Passivity Analysis of Higher Order Evolutionary Dy…
Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…
Measures of wealth and production have been found to scale superlinearly with the population of a city. Therefore, it makes economic sense for humans to congregate together in dense settlements. A recent model of population dynamics showed…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
In this paper, we propose a passivity-based methodology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that convergence to…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
We study the influence of stochastic effects due to finite population size in the evolutionary dynamics of populations interacting in the multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma game. This paper is an extension of the investigation presented in a…
Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…
The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally…
We revisit the original hawk-dove game with slight modifications to payoff values while maintaining the fundamental principles of interaction. The practical robustness of the theoretical tools of game theory is tested on a simulated…
Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are…
This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with…
This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a…
The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…
We consider seeking generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) for noncooperative games with coupled nonlinear constraints over networks. We first revisit a well-known gradientplay dynamics from a passivity-based perspective, and address that the…
In Evolutionary game theory the payoffs are typically fixed or shaped by external environmental variables. Here, we introduce an endogenous-feedback model in which the game played coevolves directly with the population state: the payoff…
Studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer.…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…