Related papers: Opting Into Optimal Matchings
Algorithms for exchange of kidneys is one of the key successful applications in market design, artificial intelligence, and operations research. Potent immunosuppressant drugs suppress the body's ability to reject a transplanted organ up to…
To study discrimination in automated decision-making systems, scholars have proposed several definitions of fairness, each expressing a different fair ideal. These definitions require practitioners to make complex decisions regarding which…
Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…
We study revenue maximization by deterministic mechanisms for the simplest case for which Myerson's characterization does not hold: a single seller selling two items, with independently distributed values, to a single additive buyer. We…
We investigate a market without money in which agents can offer certain goods (or multiple copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange must be balanced in the sense that each agent should receive a…
Kidney paired donation programs allow patients registered with an incompatible donor to receive a suitable kidney from another donor, as long as the latter's co-registered patient, if any, also receives a kidney from a different donor. The…
We study the $b$-matching problem in bipartite graphs $G=(S,R,E)$. Each vertex $s\in S$ is a server with individual capacity $b_s$. The vertices $r\in R$ are requests that arrive online and must be assigned instantly to an eligible server.…
We introduce the cycle intersection graph of a graph, an adaptation of the cycle graph of a graph, and use the structure of these graphs to prove an upper bound for the decycling number of all even graphs. This bound is shown to be…
We describe and analyse a simple greedy algorithm \2G\ that finds a good 2-matching $M$ in the random graph $G=G_{n,cn}^{\d\geq 3}$ when $c\geq 15$. A 2-matching is a spanning subgraph of maximum degree two and $G$ is drawn uniformly from…
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for the desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and…
We study the problem of designing optimal auctions under restrictions on the set of permissible allocations. In addition to allowing us to restrict to deterministic mechanisms, we can also indirectly model non-additive valuations. We prove…
Nervous systems, like any organismal structure, have been shaped by evolutionary processes to increase fitness. The resulting neural 'bauplan' has to account for multiple objectives simultaneously, including computational function as well…
We consider a broker who has to place a large order which consumes a sizable part of average daily trading volume. The broker's aim is thus to minimize execution costs he incurs from the adverse impact of his trades on market prices. By…
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines…
Motivated by adjacency in perfect matching polytopes, we study the shortest reconfiguration problem of perfect matchings via alternating cycles. Namely, we want to find a shortest sequence of perfect matchings which transforms one given…
We consider the problem of matching applicants to posts where applicants have preferences over posts. Thus the input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (A U P,E), where A denotes a set of applicants, P is a set of posts, and there are…
In bipartite matching problems, vertices on one side of a bipartite graph are paired with those on the other. In its online variant, one side of the graph is available offline, while the vertices on the other side arrive online. When a…
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…