Related papers: Opting Into Optimal Matchings
We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be…
Many decision-making algorithms draw inspiration from the inner workings of individual biological systems. However, it remains unclear whether collective behavior among biological species can also lead to solutions for computational tasks.…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
In an observational study, matching aims to create many small sets of similar treated and control units from initial samples that may differ substantially in order to permit more credible causal inferences. The problem of constructing…
Relatives and friends of an end-stage renal disease patient who offer to donate a kidney are often found to be incompatible with their intended recipients. Kidney paired donation matches one patient and his incompatible donor with another…
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…
In this article we consider networks, which for a given time period can have one link broken. Which new link should we build so the closeness of the resulting network satisfies some optimal criteria? We consider different criteria for…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We study the classical problem of matching $n$ agents to $n$ objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature: Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead…
We consider a well-studied online random graph model for kidney exchange, where nodes representing patient-donor pairs arrive over time, and the probability of a directed edge is p. We assume existence of a single altruistic donor, who…
Based on the success of recommender systems in e-commerce, there is growing interest in their use in matching markets (e.g., labor). While this holds potential for improving market fluidity and fairness, we show in this paper that naively…
A typical problem in optimal design theory is finding an experimental design that is optimal with respect to some criteria in a class of designs. The most popular criteria include the A- and D-criteria. Regular graph designs occur in many…
It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use…
Given a bipartite graph, where the two sets of vertices are applicants and posts and ranks on the edges represent preferences of applicants over posts, a {\em rank-maximal} matching is one in which the maximum number of applicants is…
The seminal work of Roth, S\"onmez, & \"Unver shows that the Edmonds-Gallai structure theorem for non-bipartite matching can be leveraged to yield a randomized algorithm to match patient-donor pairs in kidney exchange with extraordinarily…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to grasp…