Related papers: Playing Tennis without Envy
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a ``cake'' (i.e., a divisible resource) and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players feels to have received a ``fair'' amount of the cake. An important…
We consider the assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over $m$ objects and the objects are allocated to the agents based on the preferences. In a recent paper, Brams, Kilgour, and Klamler (2014) presented the AL…
We study repeated task assignment as an instrument for providing effort incentives. Unlike traditional incentive instruments, assignment of a task both determines who produces and provides incentives, and incentives for one worker spill…
The classic house allocation problem is primarily concerned with finding a matching between a set of agents and a set of houses that guarantees some notion of economic efficiency (e.g. utilitarian welfare). While recent works have shifted…
The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental and ubiquitous managerial function, typically involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the prevalence of this task in practice, the…
Professional team sports provide an excellent domain for studying the dynamics of social competitions. These games are constructed with simple, well-defined rules and payoffs that admit a high-dimensional set of possible actions and…
In the allocation of indivisible goods, a prominent fairness notion is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We initiate the study of reachability problems in fair division by investigating the problem of whether one EF1 allocation can be…
Drafts are sequential round-robin allocation procedures for distributing heterogeneous and indivisible objects among agents subject to some priority order (e.g., allocating players' contract rights to teams in professional sports leagues).…
Ladder tournaments are widely used to rank individuals in real-world organizations and games. Their mathematical properties however are still poorly understood. We formalize the ranking rule generated by a ladder tournament, and we show…
Fairness is essential for human society, contributing to stability and productivity. Similarly, fairness is also the key for many multi-agent systems. Taking fairness into multi-agent learning could help multi-agent systems become both…
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of…
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are…
Tournaments are a widely used mechanism to rank alternatives in a noisy environment. This paper investigates a fundamental issue of economics in tournament design: what is the best usage of limited resources, that is, how should the…
We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new axiomatic properties for allocations in this model: EF1+- and EFX+-. We compare these with the existing EF1 and…
A tournament organizer must select one of $n$ possible teams as the winner of a competition after observing all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches between them. The organizer would like to find a tournament rule that simultaneously satisfies the…
We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…
Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a well-explored problem. Traditionally, research focused on individual fairness - are individual agents satisfied with their allotted share? - and group fairness - are groups of agents treated fairly?…
Teams frequently compete on multiple fronts: political parties contest districts for majority control, contractors field specialized units to win procurement contracts, and squads play match by match for titles. Although the prize accrues…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be…