Related papers: Differentiating Infinite Voting Populations using …
Arrow's theorem implies that a social choice function satisfying Transitivity, the Pareto Principle (Unanimity) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) must be dictatorial. When non-strict preferences are allowed, a dictatorial…
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a seminal result of Social Choice Theory that demonstrates the impossibility of ranked-choice decision-making processes to jointly satisfy a number of intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints. The…
Autonomous sorting is a crucial task in industrial robotics which can be very challenging depending on the expected amount of automation. Usually, to decide where to sort an object, the system needs to solve either an instance retrieval…
The aim of this paper is to construct ultrafilters without immediate predecessors in the Rudin-Frolik order in $\beta \kappa\setminus \kappa$, where $\kappa$ is a regular cardinal. This generalizes the problem posed by Peter Simon more than…
In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…
This paper presents some fundamental collective choice theory for information system designers, particularly those working in the field of computer-supported cooperative work. This paper is focused on a presentation of Arrow's Possibility…
The major finding, of this article, is an ensemble method, but more exactly, a novel, better ranked voting system (and other variations of it), that aims to solve the problem of finding the best candidate to represent the voters. We have…
In 1950 Arrow famously showed that there is no social welfare function satisfying four basic conditions. In 1976, on the other hand, Gibbard and Sonnenschein showed that there does exist a unique probabilistic social welfare method that…
Serial dictatorship is a simple mechanism for coordinating agents in solving combinatorial optimization problems according to their preferences. The most representative such problem is one-sided matching, in which a set of n agents have…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, according to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaranteed to return an allocation which is efficient but…
In this paper we introduce a new mathematical tool to solve fractional equations representing models of fractional systems : The Ultradistributions. Ultradistributions permit us to unify the notion of integral and derivative in one only…
The development of synoptic sky surveys has led to a massive amount of data for which resources needed for analysis are beyond human capabilities. To process this information and to extract all possible knowledge, machine learning…
Understanding political phenomena requires measuring the political preferences of society. We introduce a model based on mixtures of spatial voting models that infers the underlying distribution of political preferences of voters with only…
Given an ordered structure, we study a natural way to extend the order to preorders on type spaces. For definably complete, linearly ordered structures, we give a characterisation of the preorder on the space of 1-types. We apply these…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
Voting methods are instrumental design elements of democracies. Citizens use them to express and aggregate their preferences to reach a collective decision. However, voting outcomes can be as sensitive to voting rules as they are to…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…
We study various orders on countably complete ultrafilters on ordinals that coincide and are wellorders under a hypothesis called the Ultrapower Axiom. Our main focus is on the relationship between the Ultrapower Axiom and the linearity of…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…