Related papers: Contingent Payment Mechanisms for Resource Utiliza…
The influence maximization (IM) problem aims at finding a subset of seed nodes in a social network that maximize the spread of influence. In this study, we focus on a sub-class of IM problems, where whether the nodes are willing to be the…
Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing…
In real-life complex systems, individuals often encounter multiple social dilemmas that cannot be effectively captured using a single-game model. Furthermore, the environment and limited resources both play a crucial role in shaping…
As electricity consumption grows, reducing peak demand--the maximum load on the grid--has become critical for preventing infrastructure strain and blackouts. Pricing mechanisms that incentivize consumers with flexible loads to shift…
Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by…
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, according to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaranteed to return an allocation which is efficient but…
A central challenge in using price signals to coordinate the electricity consumption of a group of users is the operator's lack of knowledge of the users due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we develop a two-time-scale incentive…
We study a continuous time contracting model in which a principal hires a risk averse agent to manage a project over a finite horizon and provides sequential payments whose timing is endogenously determined. The resulting nonzero-sum…
We consider the problem of allocating divisible items among multiple agents, and consider the setting where any agent is allowed to introduce diversity constraints on the items they are allocated. We motivate this via settings where the…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
Because an agents resources dictate what actions it can possibly take, it should plan which resources it holds over time carefully, considering its inherent limitations (such as power or payload restrictions), the competing needs of other…
We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits their intended destination and is assigned a route to follow that minimizes the social cost (i.e., travel…
We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
In transmission expansion planning, situations can arise in which an expansion plan that is optimal for the system as a whole is detrimental to a specific country in terms of its expected economic welfare. If this country is one of the…
In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent…
We consider an online resource allocation problem where multiple resources, each with an individual initial capacity, are available to serve random requests arriving sequentially over multiple discrete time periods. At each time period, one…
The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is the maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing…