Related papers: Stochastic Timed Games Revisited
We study "logit dynamics" [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] for strategic games. This dynamics works as follows: at every stage of the game a player is selected uniformly at random and she plays according to a "noisy" best-response…
An average-time game is played on the infinite graph of configurations of a finite timed automaton. The two players, Min and Max, construct an infinite run of the automaton by taking turns to perform a timed transition. Player Min wants to…
Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…
We study the time-bounded reachability problem for continuous-time Markov decision processes (CTMDPs) and games (CTMGs). Existing techniques for this problem use discretisation techniques to break time into discrete intervals, and optimal…
The optimal value computation for turned-based stochastic games with reachability objectives, also known as simple stochastic games, is one of the few problems in $NP \cap coNP$ which are not known to be in $P$. However, there are some…
We introduce a framework for stochastic games on large sparse graphs, covering continuous-time and discrete-time dynamic games as well as static games. Players are indexed by the vertices of simple, locally finite graphs, allowing both…
We introduce CUT, the class of 2-player partition games. These are NIM type games, played on a finite number of heaps of beans. The rules are given by a set of positive integers, which specifies the number of allowed splits a player can…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
Understanding the strategic behavior of miners in a blockchain is of great importance for its proper operation. A common model for mining games considers an infinite time horizon, with players optimizing asymptotic average objectives.…
Formulating cyber-security problems with attackers and defenders as a partially observable stochastic game has become a trend recently. Among them, the one-sided two-player zero-sum partially observable stochastic game (OTZ-POSG) has…
We consider a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic differential game. The time-inconsistency arises from the presence of quadratic terms of the expected state as well as state-dependent term in the objective functionals. We…
We consider two-player turn-based games with zero-reachability and zero-safety objectives generated by extended vector addition systems with states. Although the problem of deciding the winner in such games is undecidable in general, we…
We study two-player games on finite graphs. Turn-based games have many nice properties, but concurrent games are harder to tame: e.g. turn-based stochastic parity games have positional optimal strategies, whereas even basic concurrent…
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…
Shapley's discounted stochastic games, Everett's recursive games and Gillette's undiscounted stochastic games are classical models of game theory describing two-player zero-sum games of potentially infinite duration. We describe algorithms…
This paper is about a set-based computing method for solving a general class of two-player zero-sum Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the game is modeled by a set of coupled nonlinear differential equations, which can be…
We study stochastic games with energy-parity objectives, which combine quantitative rewards with a qualitative $\omega$-regular condition: The maximizer aims to avoid running out of energy while simultaneously satisfying a parity condition.…
There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…
This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…
One of the proposed solutions to the equilibrium selection problem for agents learning in repeated games is obtained via the notion of stochastic stability. Learning algorithms are perturbed so that the Markov chain underlying the learning…