Related papers: A mathematical model for a gaming community

We investigate the unbiased model for money exchanges: agents give at random time a dollar to one another (if they have one). Surprisingly, this dynamics eventually leads to a geometric distribution of wealth (shown empirically by…

This paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. Let games for some family have common dynamics, running costs and capabilities of players, and let these games differ in densities only. We show that the Dynamic Programming…

Toral (2002) considered an ensemble of N\geq2 players. In game B a player is randomly selected to play Parrondo's original capital-dependent game. In game A' two players are randomly selected without replacement, and the first transfers one…

We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of…

It is known that a gambler repeating a game with positive expected value has a positive probability to never go broke. We use the mass transport method to prove the generalization of this fact where the gains from the bets form a…

This paper analyzes a simple game with $n$ players. We fix a mean, $\mu$, in the interval $[0, 1]$ and let each player choose any random variable distributed on that interval with the given mean. The winner of the zero-sum game is the…

Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the column player, chooses a column. The payoff of the row player is…

What would you do if you were invited to play a game where you were given \$25 and allowed to place bets for 30 minutes on a coin that you were told was biased to come up heads 60% of the time? This is exactly what we did, gathering 61…

In the present paper we consider one class of zero-sum games with discontinuous payoffs which may have no solutions in the sets of pure or mixed strategies. We show that, however, the solution always exists in the set of so-called $\mathcal…

We study a dynamical system defined by a repeated game on a 1D lattice, in which the players keep track of their gross payoffs over time in a bank. Strategy updates are governed by a Boltzmann distribution which depends on the neighborhood…

In a casino where arbitrarily small bets are admissible, any betting strategy M can be modified into a savings strategy that, not only is successful on each casino sequence where M is (thus accumulating unbounded wealth inside the casino)…

We present a quantitative theory, based on crowd effects, for the market volatility in a Minority Game played by a mixed population. Below a critical concentration of generalized strategy players, we find that the volatility in the crowded…

We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…

In this expository note, we give a simple proof that a gambler repeating a game with positive expected value never goes broke with a positive probability. This does not immediately follow from the strong law of large numbers or other basic…

We study the poor-biased model for money exchange introduced in [2]: agents are being randomly picked at a rate proportional to their current wealth, and then the selected agent gives a dollar to another agent picked uniformly at random.…

Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a…

We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…

Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…