Related papers: Strategic Contention Resolution with Limited Feedb…

We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…

We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

We analyze the problem of distributed power allocation for orthogonal multiple access channels by considering a continuous non-cooperative game whose strategy space represents the users' distribution of transmission power over the network's…

This paper proposes a general framework for constructing feedback controllers that drive complex dynamical systems to "efficient" steady-state (or slowly varying) operating points. Efficiency is encoded using generalized equations which can…

Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

Formal analyses of incentives for compliance with network protocols often appeal to game-theoretic models and concepts. Applications of game-theoretic analysis to network security have generally been limited to highly stylized models, where…

The behavior of rational and selfish players (receivers) over a multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian broadcast channel is investigated using the framework of noncooperative game theory. In contrast to the game-theoretic model of the…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

It has been shown that a decentralized relay selection protocol based on opportunistic feedback from the relays yields good throughput performance in dense wireless networks. This selection strategy supports a hybrid-ARQ transmission…

The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…

Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, opponent responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss…

We consider $k$-resilient sequential equilibria, strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most $k$ players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, regardless of its local state. We prove that all $k$-resilient…

We study \emph{partial-information} two-player turn-based games on graphs with omega-regular objectives, when the partial-information player has \emph{limited memory}. Such games are a natural formalization for reactive synthesis when the…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…

We consider a class of hierarchical noncooperative $N$-player games where the $i$th player solves a parametrized stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) with the caveat that the implicit form of the $i$th…

A correlated equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in game theory that enjoys many desirable properties. However, it requires a trusted mediator, which is a major drawback in many practical applications. A computational solution to…

This paper addresses the adaptive consensus problem in uncertain multi-agent systems, particularly under challenges posed by quantized communication. We consider agents with general linear dynamics subject to nonlinear uncertainties and…