Related papers: Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flow…

We study a class of deterministic mean field games and related optimal control problems, with a finite time horizon and in which the state space is a network. An agent controls her velocity, and, when she occupies a vertex, she can either…

We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…

In this work we completely characterize how the frequency with which each player participates in the game dynamics affects the possibility of reaching efficient states, i.e., states with an approximation ratio within a constant factor from…

In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…

This paper studies the performance of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) when the nodes, that form a Poisson point process, selfishly choose their Medium Access Probability (MAP). We consider goodput and delay as the performance metric that…

We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…

We consider the behavior of the price of anarchy and equilibrium flows in nonatomic multi-commodity routing games as a function of the traffic demand. We analyze their smoothness with a special attention to specific values of the demand at…

The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…

We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

We consider dynamic equilibria for flows over time under the fluid queuing model. In this model, queues on the links of a network take care of flow propagation. Flow enters the network at a single source and leaves at a single sink. In a…

In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a selfish independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost \alpha. Together the agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph) while…

Rosenthal (1973) introduced the class of congestion games and proved that they always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Fotakis et al. (2005) introduce the notion of a greedy strategy tuple, where players sequentially and…

We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with $n$ agents. We focus on the model of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior…

Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…

Logit-response dynamics (Alos-Ferrer and Netzer, Games and Economic Behavior 2010) are a rich and natural class of noisy best-response dynamics. In this work we revise the price of anarchy and the price of stability by considering the…

We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…

We prove that every finite two-person shortest path game, where the local cost of every move is positive for each player, has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure stationary strategies, which can be computed in polynomial time. We also extend…

We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…

Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…