The price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best-response dynamics
Computer Science and Game Theory
2015-12-15 v1
Abstract
Logit-response dynamics (Alos-Ferrer and Netzer, Games and Economic Behavior 2010) are a rich and natural class of noisy best-response dynamics. In this work we revise the price of anarchy and the price of stability by considering the quality of long-run equilibria in these dynamics. Our results show that prior studies on simpler dynamics of this type can strongly depend on a synchronous schedule of the players' moves. In particular, a small noise by itself is not enough to improve the quality of equilibria as soon as other very natural schedules are used.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1512.04017,
title = {The price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best-response dynamics},
author = {Paolo Penna},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.04017},
year = {2015}
}