Related papers: Online Budgeted Truthful Matching
This paper considers the classic Online Steiner Forest problem where one is given a (weighted) graph $G$ and an arbitrary set of $k$ terminal pairs $\{\{s_1,t_1\},\ldots ,\{s_k,t_k\}\}$ that are required to be connected. The goal is to…
We study the performance of a best reply algorithm for online resource allocation problems with a diseconomy of scale. In an online resource allocation problem, we are given a set of resources and a set of requests that arrive in an online…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
Matching, capturing allocation of items to unit-demand buyers, or tasks to workers, or pairs of collaborators, is a central problem in economics. Indeed, the growing prevalence of matching-based markets, many of which online in nature, has…
We study online weighted bipartite matching of reusable resources where an adversarial sequence of requests for resources arrive over time. A resource that is matched is 'used' for a random duration, drawn independently from a…
Motivated by applications in the gig economy, we study approximation algorithms for a \emph{sequential pricing problem}. The input is a bipartite graph $G=(I,J,E)$ between individuals $I$ and jobs $J$. The platform has a value of $v_j$ for…
We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problem motivated by the problem of $\textit{securities lending}$ in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short selling of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of…
We consider a dynamic system with multiple types of customers and servers. Each type of waiting customer or server joins a separate queue, forming a bipartite graph with customer-side queues and server-side queues. The platform can match…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
We investigate the terminal-pairability problem in the case when the base graph is a complete bipartite graph, and the demand graph is a (not necessarily bipartite) multigraph on the same vertex set. In computer science, this problem is…
Vertex integrity is a graph parameter that measures the connectivity of a graph. Informally, its meaning is that a graph has small vertex integrity if it has a small separator whose removal disconnects the graph into connected components…
A maximum priority matching is a matching in an undirected graph that maximizes a priority score defined with respect to given vertex priorities. An earlier paper showed how to find maximum priority matchings in unweighted graphs. This…
A balanced partition is a clustering of a graph into a given number of equal-sized parts. For instance, the Bisection problem asks to remove at most k edges in order to partition the vertices into two equal-sized parts. We prove that…
Consider an online facility assignment problem where a set of facilities $F = \{ f_1, f_2, f_3, \cdots, f_{|F|} \}$ of equal capacity $l$ is situated on a metric space and customers arrive one by one in an online manner on that space. We…
Online bidding is a classical problem in online decision-making, with applications in resource allocation, hierarchical clustering, and the analysis of approximation algorithms. We study its randomized learning-augmented variant, where an…
We present a unified framework for designing and analyzing algorithms for online budgeted allocation problems (including online matching) and their generalization, the Online Generalized Assignment Problem (OnGAP). These problems have been…
We consider a cost sharing problem on a weighted undirected graph, where all the nodes want to connect to a special node called source, and they need to share the total cost (weights) of the used edges. Each node except for the source has a…
We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions, which applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions. Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format…
In the classical facility location problem we consider a graph $G$ with fixed weights on the edges of $G$. The goal is then to find an optimal positioning for a set of facilities on the graph with respect to some objective function. We…
We introduce the Funding Game, in which $m$ identical resources are to be allocated among $n$ selfish agents. Each agent requests a number of resources $x_i$ and reports a valuation $\tilde{v}_i(x_i)$, which verifiably {\em lower}-bounds…