Related papers: Games of multicellularity
The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…
The evolution of multicellularity was a major transition in the history of life on earth. Conditions under which multicellularity is favored have been studied theoretically and experimentally. But since the construction of a multicellular…
We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and…
A cellular game is a dynamical system in which cells, placed in some discrete structure, are regarded as playing a game with their immediate neighbors. Individual strategies may be either deterministic or stochastic. Strategy success is…
To our knowledge, the populations are generally assumed to be homogeneous in the traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we focus on the inhomogeneous populations. A simple model which can describe the inhomogeneity of the…
The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…
We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at…
Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the…
We introduce and analyze a purely competitive dynamics for the evolution of an infinite population subject to a 3-strategy game. We argue that this dynamics represents a characterization of how certain systems, both natural and artificial,…
We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation…
Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction…
Natural selection favors the more successful individuals. This is the elementary premise that pervades common models of evolution. Under extreme conditions, however, the process may no longer be probabilistic. Those that meet certain…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
A new approach to understanding evolution [Val09], namely viewing it through the lens of computation, has already started yielding new insights, e.g., natural selection under sexual reproduction can be interpreted as the Multiplicative…