Related papers: Evaluating Power System Vulnerability to False Dat…
This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to…
Potential vulnerabilities in a power grid can be exposed by identifying those transmission lines on which attacks (in the form of interference with their transmission capabilities) causes maximum disruption to the grid. In this study, we…
We study the security threats of power system operation brought by a class of data injection attacks upon load forecasting algorithms. In particular, with minimal assumptions on the knowledge and ability of the attacker, we design attack…
This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to…
This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being…
An unobservable false data injection (FDI) attack on AC state estimation (SE) is introduced and its consequences on the physical system are studied. With a focus on understanding the physical consequences of FDI attacks, a bi-level…
The resilience of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for electric power networks for certain cyber-attacks is considered. We analyze the vulnerability of the measurement system to false data attack on communicated…
Active distribution networks facilitating bidirectional power exchange with renewable energy resources are susceptible to cyberattacks due to integration of a diverse array of cyber components. This study introduces a grid-level defense…
In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks…
Cyber data attacks are the worst-case interacting bad data to power system state estimation and cannot be detected by existing bad data detectors. In this paper, we for the first time analyze the likelihood of cyber data attacks by…
The security of energy supply in a power grid critically depends on the ability to accurately estimate the state of the system. However, manipulated power flow measurements can potentially hide overloads and bypass the bad data detection…
In power systems, unpredictable events like extreme weather, equipment failures, and cyberattacks present significant challenges to ensuring safety and reliability. Ensuring resilience in the face of these uncertainties is crucial for…
Power systems become more prone to cyber-attacks due to the high integration of information technologies. In this paper, we demonstrate that the outages of some lines can be masked by injecting false data into a set of measurements. The…
In this paper, we present the concept of boosting the resiliency of optimization-based observers for cyber-physical systems (CPS) using auxiliary sources of information. Due to the tight coupling of physics, communication and computation, a…
Understanding smart grid cyber attacks is key for developing appropriate protection and recovery measures. Advanced attacks pursue maximized impact at minimized costs and detectability. This paper conducts risk analysis of combined data…
In this paper a new class of cyber attacks against state estimation in the electric power grid is considered. This class of attacks is named false data injection attacks. We show that with the knowledge of the system configuration an…
This paper studies the performance and resilience of a cyber-physical control system (CPCS) with attack detection and reactive attack mitigation. It addresses the problem of deriving an optimal sequence of false data injection attacks that…
Cyber-physical attacks impose a significant threat to the smart grid, as the cyber attack makes it difficult to identify the actual damage caused by the physical attack. To defend against such attacks, various inference-based solutions have…
This work presents two methodologies to enhance vulnerability assessment in power systems using bilevel attacker-defender network interdiction models. First, we introduce a systematic evaluation procedure for comparing different optimal…
This paper studies the vulnerability of flow networks against adversarial attacks. In particular, consider a power system (or, any system carrying a physical flow) consisting of $N$ transmission lines with initial loads $L_1, \ldots , L_N$…