Related papers: Optimal Design of Robust Combinatorial Mechanisms …
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these…
We study the problem of designing systems in order to minimize cost while meeting a given flexibility target. Flexibility is attained by enforcing a joint chance constraint, which ensures that the system will exhibit feasible operation with…
We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the object's value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained…
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
A novel distributed algorithm is proposed for finite-time converging to a feasible consensus solution satisfying global optimality to a certain accuracy of the distributed robust convex optimization problem (DRCO) subject to bounded…
We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and budgets. The prior may be…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
In this paper a class of optimization problems with uncertain linear constraints is discussed. It is assumed that the constraint coefficients are random vectors whose probability distributions are only partially known. Possibility theory is…
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a broker, in a regret…
We consider a fixed-price mechanism design setting where a seller sells one item via a social network, but the seller can only directly communicate with her neighbours initially. Each other node in the network is a potential buyer with a…
This paper studies the estimation of ranked-list discrete choice models with single and multiple purchases. In this setting, each consumer type is characterized by a ranking over a subset of products and a desired number of purchases, and…
In this paper we focus on the unconstrained binary quadratic optimization model, maximize x^t Qx, x binary, and consider the problem of identifying optimal solutions that are robust with respect to perturbations in the Q matrix.. We are…
We study a multi-dimensional optimal execution problem in illiquid markets with both instantaneous and persistent price impact and stochastic resilience. In our model the value function can be described by a multi-dimensional backward…
Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of uncertain quality for the buyer. The seller has a set of…
Mathematical models simulate various events under different conditions, enabling an early overview of the system to be implemented in practice, reducing the waste of resources and in less time. In project optimization, these models play a…
This paper studies a robust utility maximization problem for intractable claims under distributional ambiguity, where the distribution of the claim cannot be inferred from market information and its dependence with tradable assets is…
We examine robust output feedback control of discrete-time nonlinear systems with bounded uncertainties affecting the dynamics and measurements. Specifically, we demonstrate how to construct semi-infinite programs that produce gains to…
Chance constraints are frequently used to limit the probability of constraint violations in real-world optimization problems where the constraints involve stochastic components. We study chance-constrained submodular optimization problems,…
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often…
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of…