Related papers: Multidimensional matching
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
We consider the theoretical properties of a model which encompasses bi-partite matching under transferable utility on the one hand, and hedonic pricing on the other. This framework is intimately connected to tripartite matching problems…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
We study a class of semi-discrete variational problems that arise in economic matching and game theory, where agents with continuous attributes are matched to a finite set of outcomes with a one dimensional structure. Such problems appear…
Becker (1973) presents a bilateral matching model in which scalar types describe agents. For this framework, he establishes the conditions under which positive sorting between agents' attributes is the unique market outcome. Becker's…
Multidimensional network data can have different levels of complexity, as nodes may be characterized by heterogeneous individual-specific features, which may vary across the networks. This paper introduces a class of models for…
Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…
We study gains from trade in multi-dimensional two-sided markets. Specifically, we focus on a setting with $n$ heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller $i$, and there is a constrained-additive buyer with…
We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer-seller pair may either trade directly or use the services of a middleman; and a middleman may serve multiple buyer-seller pairs. Direct trade…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
This paper characterizes equilibrium properties of a broad class of economic models that allow multiple heterogeneous agents to interact in heterogeneous manners across several markets. Our key contribution is a new theorem providing…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with perfectly transferable utilities. We do so without imposing parametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity and with…
Spatial partial equilibrium models incorporating conjectural variations are widely used to analyze the development of oligopolistic multi-agent markets, such as international energy and raw material markets. Although this model type can…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
Adverse selection is a version of the principal-agent problem that includes monopolist nonlinear pricing, where a monopolist with known costs seeks a profit-maximizing price menu facing a population of potential consumers whose preferences…
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match. Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and…