Related papers: Multidimensional matching
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes. When the matching surplus is quadratic, the marginal distributions of the characteristics are…
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
In their study of price discrimination for a monopolist selling heterogeneous products to consumers having private information about their own multidimensional types, Rochet and Chon\'e (1998) discovered a new form of screening in which…
We present a general two-side market model with divisible commodities and price functions of participants. A general existence result on unbounded sets is obtained from its variational inequality re-formulation. We describe an extension of…
In market modeling, one often treats buyers as a homogeneous group. In this paper we consider buyers with heterogeneous preferences and products available in many variants. Such a framework allows us to successfully model various market…
We study scenarios where multiple sellers of a homogeneous good compete on prices, where each seller can only sell to some subset of the buyers. Crucially, sellers cannot price-discriminate between buyers. We model the structure of the…
We characterize the extreme points of multidimensional monotone functions from $[0,1]^n$ to $[0,1]$, as well as the extreme points of the set of one-dimensional marginals of these functions. These characterizations lead to new results for…
Building on the macroscopic market making framework as a control problem, this paper investigates its extension to stochastic games. In the context of price competition, each agent is benchmarked against the best quote offered by the…
Different voters behave differently, different governments make different decisions, or different organizations are ruled differently. Many research questions important to political scientists concern choice behavior, which involves dealing…
We study equilibrium in hedonic markets, when consumers and suppliers have reservation utilities, and the utility functions are separable with respect to price. There is one indivisible good, which comes in different qualities; each…
Bipartite b-matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to one or more agents or items on the other, is a classical model that is used in myriad application areas such as healthcare, advertising, education, and general…
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…
A broad set of empirical phenomenon in the study of social, economic and machine behaviour can be modelled as complex systems with averaging dynamics. However many of these models naturally result in consensus or consensus-like outcomes. In…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
This paper derives conditions under which preferences and technology are nonparametrically identified in hedonic equilibrium models, where products are differentiated along more than one dimension and agents are characterized by several…
Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents…
In this paper, the synchronization of heterogeneous agents interacting over a dynamical network is studied. The edge dynamics can model the inter-agent communications which are often heterogeneous by nature. They can also model the…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
Data heterogeneity across multiple sources is common in real-world machine learning (ML) settings. Although many methods focus on enabling a single model to handle diverse data, real-world markets often comprise multiple competing ML…