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This paper is concerned with complexity theoretic aspects of a general formulation of quantum game theory that models strategic interactions among rational agents that process and exchange quantum information. In particular, we prove that…

We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…

The Colonel Blotto game, formulated by Emile Borel, involves players allocating limited resources to multiple battlefields simultaneously, with the winner being the one who allocates more resources to each battlefield. Computation of the…

The problem of finding pure strategy Nash equilibria in multiagent concurrent games with finite-horizon temporal goals has received some recent attention. Earlier work solved this problem through the use of Rabin automata. In this work, we…

This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…

This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…

We study rational synthesis problems for concurrent games with omega-regular objectives. Our model of rationality considers only pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy either a social welfare or Pareto optimality condition with respect…

Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…

We study the complexity of several combinatorial problems in the model of binary networked public goods games. In this game, players are represented by vertices in a network, and the action of each player can be either investing or not…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…

We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…

We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of at least one player's actions grows. Furthermore,…

This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods…

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…

Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) interleaves empirical game-theoretic analysis with deep reinforcement learning (DRL) to solve games too complex for traditional analytic methods. Tree-exploiting PSRO (TE-PSRO) is a variant of this…