Related papers: Uniform Value for Recursive Games with Compact Act…

Regular games form a well-established class of games for analysis and synthesis of reactive systems. They include coloured Muller games, McNaughton games, Muller games, Rabin games, and Streett games. These games are played on directed…

We study zero-sum games, a variant of the classical combinatorial Subtraction games (studied for example in the monumental work "Winning Ways", by Berlekamp, Conway and Guy), called Cumulative Subtraction (CS). Two players alternate in…

In several standard models of dynamic programming (gambling houses, MDPs, POMDPs), we prove the existence of a very robust notion of value for the infinitely repeated problem, namely the pathwise uniform value. This solves two open…

Here, we consider one-dimensional forward-forward mean-field games (MFGs) with congestion, which were introduced to approximate stationary MFGs. We use methods from the theory of conservation laws to examine the qualitative properties of…

We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general \cadlag measurable processes. As a by-product of…

We give an example of a zero-sum stochastic game with four states, compact action sets for each player, and continuous payoff and transition functions, such that the discounted value does not converge as the discount factor tends to 0, and…

Let S be a topological property of sequences (such as, for example, "to contain a convergent subsequence" or "to have an accumulation point"). We introduce the following open-point game OP(X,S) on a topological space X. In the n'th move,…

Combinatorial Game Theory has also been called `additive game theory', whenever the analysis involves sums of independent game components. Such {\em disjunctive sums} invoke comparison between games, which allows abstract values to be…

In this paper we study how to play (stochastic) games optimally using little space. We focus on repeated games with absorbing states, a type of two-player, zero-sum concurrent mean-payoff games. The prototypical example of these games is…

Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…

In 1901, Bouton proved that a winning strategy of the game of Nim is given by the bitwise XOR, called the nim-sum. But, why does such a weird binary operation work? Led by this question, this paper introduces a categorical reinterpretation…

We consider a new class of repeated zero-sum games in which the payoff is the escape rate of a switched dynamical system, where at every stage, the transition is given by a nonexpansive operator depending on the actions of both players.…

We study Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games (RCSGs), extending our recent analysis of recursive simple stochastic games to a concurrent setting where the two players choose moves simultaneously and independently at each state. For…

Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an \epsilon-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every \epsilon >0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the…

Mean field games allow to describe tractable models of dynamic games with a continuum of players, explicit interaction and heterogeneous states. Thus, these models are of great interest for socio-economic applications. A particular class of…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

We study an impartial achievement game introduced by Anderson and Harary. The game is played by two players who alternately select previously unselected elements of a finite group. The game ends when the jointly selected elements generate…

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…