Related papers: Network Formation Game with Different Cost Value f…
We experimentally study effort provision and network formation in the linear-quadratic game characterized by positive externality and complementarity of effort choices among network neighbors. We compare experimental outcomes to the…
We study network formation with n players and link cost \alpha > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number of…
We study Nash equilibria in the network creation game of Fabrikant et al.[10]. In this game a vertex can buy an edge to another vertex for a cost of $\alpha$, and the objective of each vertex is to minimize the sum of the costs of the edges…
We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…
In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For…
We consider a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has unit price and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its local diameter…
Players allocate their budget to links, a local public good and a private good. A player links to free ride on others' public good provision. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, large…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added…
Selfish Network Creation focuses on modeling real world networks from a game-theoretic point of view. One of the classic models by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] is the network creation game, where agents correspond to nodes in a network which…
We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
An atomic routing game is a multiplayer game on a directed graph. Each player in the game chooses a path -- a sequence of links that connect its origin node to its destination node -- with the lowest cost, where the cost of each link is a…
We investigate several variants of a network creation model: a group of agents builds up a network between them while trying to keep the costs of this network small. The cost function consists of two addends, namely (i) a constant amount…
In many scenarios, networks emerge endogenously as cognitive agents establish links in order to exchange information. Network formation has been widely studied in economics, but only on the basis of simplistic models that assume that the…
Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] many variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions have the drawback that edges…
We propose a novel network formation game that explains the emergence of various hierarchical structures in groups where self-interested or utility-maximizing individuals decide to establish or severe relationships of authority or…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
The common sense suggests that networks are not random mazes of purposeless connections, but that these connections are organised so that networks can perform their functions well. One function common to many networks is targeted transport…
We study a network formation game where nodes wish to send traffic to other nodes. Nodes can contract bilaterally other nodes to form bidirectional links as well as nodes can break unilaterally contracts to eliminate the corresponding…