Related papers: Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Ru…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
Election systems based on scores generally determine the winner by computing the score of each candidate and the winner is the candidate with the best score. It would be natural to expect that computing the winner of an election is at least…
We propose a secure voting protocol for score-based voting rules, where independent talliers perform the tallying procedure. The protocol outputs the winning candidate(s) while preserving the privacy of the voters and the secrecy of the…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
A novel way of characterizing the process of reaching consensus for a social system is given. The foundation of the characterization is based on the theorem which states that the sufficient and necessary condition for a system to reach the…
We study the parameterized complexity of winner determination problems for three prevalent $k$-committee selection rules, namely the minimax approval voting (MAV), the proportional approval voting (PAV), and the Chamberlin-Courant's…
We provide the first social choice theory approach to the question of what constitutes a community in a social network. Inspired by the classic preferences models in social choice theory, we start from an abstract social network framework,…
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
Multiwinner voting captures a wide variety of settings, from parliamentary elections in democratic systems to product placement in online shopping platforms. There is a large body of work dealing with axiomatic characterizations,…
We study the design of voting mechanisms in a binary social choice environment where agents' cardinal valuations are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. The mechanism must be anonymous -- the outcome is invariant to…
In this paper, we present axiomatic characterizations of some simple risk-sharing (RS) rules, such as the uniform, the mean-proportional and the covariance-based linear RS rules. These characterizations make it easier to understand the…
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
We study approval-based committee voting from a novel perspective. While extant work largely centers around proportional representation of the voters, we shift our focus to the candidates while preserving proportionality. Intuitively,…
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where…
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…
Despite extensive theoretical research on proportionality in approval-based multiwinner voting, its impact on which committees and candidates can be selected in practice remains poorly understood. We address this gap by (i) analyzing the…
We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a…
In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR…
Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system…