Related papers: Pairwise Stability in Two Sided Market with Strict…
Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…
In a money exchange process involving a seller and a buyer, we develop a straightforward model encompassing conservative, non-conservative, and systems with or without debt. Our model integrates the Fermi function to capture the behavior of…
Market-based coordination of demand side assets has gained great interests in recent years. In spite of its efficiency, there is a risk that the interaction between the dynamic assets through the price signal could result in an unstable…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define pseudo-substitutable preferences, a domain that strictly…
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…
A simple computer simulation model of a closed market on a fixed network with free flow of goods and money is introduced. The model contains only two variables : the amount of goods and money beside the size of the system. An initially flat…
We study overpricing in a repeated game between two representative agents: a market maker, who controls market liquidity, and a market taker, who chooses trade quantities. Market prices evolve through the endogenous price impact of trades…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an…
In this paper we generalize Hardy-Rogers maps in the context of coupled fixed points. We generalizes with the help of the obtained main theorem some known results about existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium in duopoly markets. We…
Double auctions are widely used in financial markets, such as those for stocks, derivatives, currencies, and commodities, to match demand and supply. Once all buyers and sellers have placed their trade requests, the exchange determines how…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
This paper is concerned with a pairs trading rule. The idea is to monitor two historically correlated securities. When divergence is underway, i.e., one stock moves up while the other moves down, a pairs trade is entered which consists of a…
Stylized facts can be regarded as constraints for any modeling attempt of price dynamics on a financial market, in that an empirically reasonable model has to reproduce these stylized facts at least qualitatively. The dynamics of market…
Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…
We consider a model of two-sided matching market where buyers and sellers trade indivisible goods with the feature that each buyer has unit demand and seller has unit supply. The result of the existence of Walrasian equilibrium and lattice…
We revisit the problem of existence of stable systems of contracts with arbitrary sets of contracts. We show that stable sets of contracts exists if choices of agents satisfy path-independence. We call such choice functions Plott functions.…