Related papers: Pairwise Stability in Two Sided Market with Strict…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
This paper deals with the alternative mathematical modeling of the two-side platform. Two-sided platforms are specific multi-sided platforms that bring together two distinct groups of a model. The stochastic modeling by adapting various…
Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs.…
We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
We present a mathematical model of a market with $m$ shares traded across $n$ investor groups, each one with similar motivations and trading strategies. The market of each asset consists of a fixed amount of cash and shares (no additions…
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the…
Two-sided manufacturing-as-a-service (MaaS) marketplaces connect clients requesting manufacturing services to suppliers providing those services. Matching mechanisms i.e. allocation of clients' orders to suppliers is a key design parameter…
Dynamic pricing schemes were introduced as an alternative to posted-price mechanisms. In contrast to static models, the dynamic setting allows to update the prices between buyer-arrivals based on the remaining sets of items and buyers, and…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…
The stability of money value is an important requisite for a functioning economy, yet it critically depends on the actions of participants in the market themselves. Here we model the value of money as a dynamical variable that results from…
While page views are often sold instantly through real-time auctions when users visit websites, they can also be sold in advance via guaranteed contracts. In this paper, we present a dynamic programming model to study how an online…
This study considers a model of the income distribution of agents whose pairwise interaction is asymmetric and price-invariant. Asymmetric transactions are typical for chain-trading groups who arrange their business such that commodities…
We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…