Related papers: A Bayesian baseline for belief in uncommon events
(l) I have enough evidence to render the sentence S probable. (la) So, relative to what I know, it is rational of me to believe S. (2) Now that I have more evidence, S may no longer be probable. (2a) So now, relative to what I know, it is…
It is generally believed that more observations provide more information. However, we observe that in the independence test for rare events, the power of the test is, surprisingly, determined by the number of rare events rather than the…
This article extends the hypotheses assessment method to the case with two competing simple hypotheses. In doing so we further clarify the benefits that hypotheses assessments can bring to classical statistical analyses. Given that…
Probability models are only useful at explaining the uncertainty of what we do not know, and should never be used to say what we already know. Probability and statistical models are useless at discerning cause. Classical statistical…
I think we can agree that dealing with uncertainty is not easy. Probability is the main tool for dealing with uncertainty, and we know there are many probability-related puzzles and paradoxes. Here I describe a rather idiosyncratic…
The intuitive reasoning of physicists in conditions of uncertainty is closer to the Bayesian approach than to the frequentist ideas taught at University and which are considered the reference framework for handling statistical problems. The…
It is well understood that Bayesian decision theory and average case analysis are essentially identical. However, if one is interested in performing uncertainty quantification for a numerical task, it can be argued that standard approaches…
Bayesian inference gets its name from *Bayes's theorem*, expressing posterior probabilities for hypotheses about a data generating process as the (normalized) product of prior probabilities and a likelihood function. But Bayesian inference…
Probabilities in the multiverse can be calculated by assuming that we are typical representatives in a given reference class. But is this class well defined? What should be included in the ensemble in which we are supposed to be typical?…
Uncertainty may be taken to characterize inferences, their conclusions, their premises or all three. Under some treatments of uncertainty, the inferences itself is never characterized by uncertainty. We explore both the significance of…
Why are some events more surprising than others? We propose that events that are more difficult to explain are those that are more surprising. The two experiments reported here test the impact of different event outcomes (Outcome-Type) and…
The process of doing Science in condition of uncertainty is illustrated with a toy experiment in which the inferential and the forecasting aspects are both present. The fundamental aspects of probabilistic reasoning, also relevant in real…
Bayesian probability theory is used as a framework to develop a formalism for the scientific method based on principles of inductive reasoning. The formalism allows for precise definitions of the key concepts in theories of physics and also…
An agent often has a number of hypotheses, and must choose among them based on observations, or outcomes of experiments. Each of these observations can be viewed as providing evidence for or against various hypotheses. All the attempts to…
Physicists have, hitherto, mostly adopted a frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability statements apply only to ensembles. It is argued that we should, instead, adopt an epistemic, or Bayesian conception, in which…
The principle of the common cause claims that if an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist a common cause. This is generally taken to mean that positive correlations between non-causally related events should disappear when…
The probability axioms by R. T. Cox can be regarded as the modern foundations of Bayesian inference, the idea of assigning degrees of belief to logical propositions in a manner consistent with Boolean logic. In this work it is shown that…
We present a propositional logic %which can be used to reason about the uncertainty of events, where the uncertainty is modeled by a set of probability measures assigning an interval of probability to each event. We give a sound and…
Is it possible for a large sequence of measurements or observations, which support a hypothesis, to counterintuitively decrease our confidence? Can unanimous support be too good to be true? The assumption of independence is often made in…
Starting from considerations about meaning and subsequent use of asymmetric uncertainty intervals of experimental results, we review the issue of uncertainty propagation. We show that, using a probabilistic approach (the so-called Bayesian…