Related papers: Approximating welfare in large efficient markets
A seller is pricing identical copies of a good to a stream of unit-demand buyers. Each buyer has a value on the good as his private information. The seller only knows the empirical value distribution of the buyer population and chooses the…
We present empirical evidence that land values are scale-free and introduce a network model that reproduces the observations. The network approach to urban modelling is based on the assumption that the market dynamics that generates land…
We study the effect of altruism in two simple asset exchange models: the yard sale model (winner gets a random fraction of the poorer player's wealth) and the theft and fraud model (winner gets a random fraction of the loser's wealth). We…
A Markovian modulation captures the trend in the market and influences the market coefficients accordingly. The different scenarios presented by the market are modeled as the distinct states of a discrete-time Markov chain. In our paper, we…
We study welfare analysis for policy changes when supply and demand behavior are only partially known. We augment the robust approach pioneered by Kang and Vasserman (2025) by incorporating the supply side. We posit intervals of feasible…
This paper presents a novel way to approximate a distribution governing a system of coupled particles with a product of independent distributions. The approach is an extension of mean field theory that allows the independent distributions…
We introduce a simple framework in which market participants update their prior about an efficient price with a model-based learning process. We show that exponential intensities for the arrival of aggressive orders arise naturally in this…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…
We consider two models of fair division with indivisible items: one for goods and one for bads. For goods, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (EF1 and EFX for goods) and three common welfare (utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash)…
We consider a financial market model which consists of a financial asset and a large number of interacting agents classified into many types. Different types of agents are heterogeneous in their price expectations. Each agent can change its…
This paper proposes a framewrok for analyzing how the welfare effects of policy interventions are distributed across individuals when those effects are unobserved. Rather than focusing solely on average outcomes, the approach uses readily…
Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…
Generative model ecosystems increasingly operate as competitive multi-platform markets, where platforms strategically select models from a shared pool and users with heterogeneous preferences choose among them. Understanding how platforms…
We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., charge richer consumers…
In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar results in…
Classical approaches to experimental design assume that intervening on one unit does not affect other units. There are many important settings, however, where this non-interference assumption does not hold, as when running experiments on…
We study a data marketplace where a broker intermediates between buyers, who seek to estimate the mean \(\mu\) of an unknown normal distribution \(\Ncal(\mu, \sigma^2)\), and contributors, who can collect data from this distribution at a…
General equilibrium equations in economics play the same role with many-body Newtonian equations in physics. Accordingly, each solution of the general equilibrium equations can be regarded as a possible microstate of the economic system.…
We continue the study of welfare maximization in unit-demand (matching) markets, in a distributed information model where agent's valuations are unknown to the central planner, and therefore communication is required to determine an…