Related papers: Semi-algebraic sets and equilibria of binary games

In a monotonic sequence game, two players alternately choose elements of a sequence from some fixed ordered set. The game ends when the resulting sequence contains either an ascending subsequence of length a or a descending one of length d.…

We deal with equations over free semilattice of infinite rank and prove that any infinite consistent system of equations is equivalent to its finite subsystem. Moreover, we describe irreducible algebraic sets and solve some algorithmic…

In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…

This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumerating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted games with minimum and the number of weighted games for the dual class…

A balanced pair in a finite ordered set $P=(V,\leq)$ is a pair $(x,y)$ of elements of $V$ such that the proportion of linear extensions of $P$ that put $x$ before $y$ is in the real interval $[1/3, 2/3]$. We prove that every finite $N$-free…

We study two impartial games introduced by Anderson and Harary. Both games are played by two players who alternately select previously-unselected elements of a finite group. The first player who builds a generating set from the…

We show that the set of realizations of a given dimension of a max-plus linear sequence is a finite union of polyhedral sets, which can be computed from any realization of the sequence. This yields an (expensive) algorithm to solve the…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

In this paper we first define a new kind of potential games, called coset weighted potential game, which is a generalized form of weighted potential game. Using semi-tensor product of matrices, an algebraic method is provided to verify…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

Two-player zero-sum "graph games" are a central model, which proceeds as follows. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, and the two players move it to produce an infinite "play", which determines the winner or payoff of the game.…

We use a reformulation of compositional game theory to reunite game theory with game semantics, by viewing an open game as the System and its choice of contexts as the Environment. Specifically, the system is jointly controlled by $n \geq…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

Semiuniform semigroups provide a natural setting for the convolution of generalized finite measures on semigroups. A semiuniform semigroup is said to be ambitable if each uniformly bounded uniformly equicontinuous set of functions on the…

This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolutely…

Semifields are semirings in which every nonzero element has a multiplicative inverse. A rough classification uses the characteristic of the semifield, that is the isomorphism type of the semifield generated by the two neutral elements. For…

This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…

A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…

We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…

We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn uniformly at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for…