Related papers: Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable…
Clearly, socio-economic freedom requires some extent of transparency regarding the implications of choices. In this paper, we review some established mechanisms for achieving such transparency, without any claim to completeness, and briefly…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
The aim of this paper is to establish a theory of random variables on domains. Domain theory is a fundamental component of theoretical computer science, providing mathematical models of computational processes. Random variables are the…
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. Despite the simplicity of this…
We present the method of moments approach to pricing barrier-type options when the underlying is modelled by a general class of jump diffusions. By general principles the option prices are linked to certain infinite dimensional linear…
This study develops a framework for testing hypotheses on structural parameters in incomplete models. Such models make set-valued predictions and hence do not generally yield a unique likelihood function. The model structure, however,…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a…
In discrete time markets with proportional transaction costs, Schachermayer (2004) shows that robust no-arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a strictly consistent price system. In this paper, we introduce the concept of prospective…
This paper studies models in which hypothesis tests have trivial power, that is, power smaller than size. This testing impossibility, or impossibility type A, arises when any alternative is not distinguishable from the null. We also study…
In a strategy-proof mechanism, the influence of an agent may be measured as the set of outcomes an agent can bring about by varying her (reported) type. More specifically, we refer to an agent's influence on her own relevant outcomes as her…
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…
We study dynamic mechanism design in a pure-exchange economy with privately observed idiosyncratic income. In the standard infinitely lived hidden-income benchmark of Green (1987) and Thomas-Worrall (1990), constrained-efficient allocations…
Over time, cryptographically deniable systems have come to be associated in computer-science literature with the idea of "denying" evidence in court - specifically, with the ability to convincingly forge evidence in courtroom scenarios and…
Forty years ago, Wiesner pointed out that quantum mechanics raises the striking possibility of money that cannot be counterfeited according to the laws of physics. We propose the first quantum money scheme that is (1) public-key, meaning…
We reconsider the concept of multi-prover commitments, as introduced in the late eighties in the seminal work by Ben-Or et al. As was recently shown by Cr\'{e}peau et al., the security of known two-prover commitment schemes not only relies…
Most work in mechanism design assumes that buyers are risk neutral; some considers risk aversion arising due to a non-linear utility for money. Yet behavioral studies have established that real agents exhibit risk attitudes which cannot be…
Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. However, bribery with money is often illegal in elections. Motivated by this, we introduce the notion of frugal bribery and formulate two new pertinent…
We consider one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ either refers to the wining probability of an object or a share of a good, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We define…